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Power outages, manipulations of data, and interruptions of Internet ac-
cess are all possible effects of cyber operations. Unfortunately, recent
efforts to address and regulate cyberspace operations under interna-
tional law often emphasize the uncommon, though severe, cyber-attacks
that cause deaths, injuries, or physical destruction. This paper deals
with cyber operations during armed conflicts that cause major disrup-
tion or interruption effects – as opposed to deaths, injuries, or physical
destruction.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the consequences of these cyber
operations that cause major disruption or interruption effects, and to
argue that they might still constitute “acts of violence,” as the term
“attacks” is defined under international humanitarian law. Cyber op-
erations that qualify as “attacks” will have to comply with the princi-
ples of distinction and proportionality, thus requiring the initiator to
design his or her cyber weapon humanely. Therefore, labeling these
cyber operations as “attacks” will promote the (1) the protection of
civilians and objects; (2) critical infrastructure, such as energy, trans-
portation and emergency services, and (3) strengthen fundamental
human rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On December 23, 2015, Ukraine experienced a major power outage, af-
fecting hundreds of thousands of people.1 This time, however, it was not an
occasional blackout caused by technical failure, high demand, or weather-
related reasons. Rather, it was a blackout caused by a cyber-attack targeting
the supervisory control and data acquisition (“SCADA”) systems of the
Ukrainian power grid.2 Although cyber operations are already used fre-
quently during armed conflicts,3 and diplomatic and political tensions, this
was the first time that cyber operations were successfully used to cause a
power outage.4
1. Alex Hern, Ukrainian Blackout Caused by Hackers that Attacked Media Company,
Researchers Say, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2016, 8:20 AM), www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/jan/07/ukrainian-blackout-hackers-attacked-media-company.
2. Vangie Beal, SCADA - Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, WEBOPEDIA,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/S/SCADA.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (defining
SCADA as an “[a]cronym for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, a computer system for
gathering and analyzing real time data. SCADA systems are used to monitor and control a
plant or equipment in industries such as telecommunications, water and waste control, energy,
oil and gas refining and transportation.”).
3. See Catherine Lotrionte, Cyberwar: Building a Normative and Legal-Based Ap-
proach for Cyberdeterrence, in LAW AND DISCIPLINARITY: THINKING BEYOND BORDERS (Rob-
ert Beck ed., 2013) 67, 69.
4. Andrea Peterson, Hackers Caused a Blackout for the First Time, Researchers Say,
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2016/01/05/hackers-caused-a-blackout-for-the-first-time-researchers-say/.
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A prolonged power outage such as this could certainly result in an enor-
mous humanitarian crisis, which would most likely be in violation of inter-
national humanitarian law (IHL), and even international criminal law.5 The
question explored by this paper, however, is whether cyber operations that
do not result in direct kinetic effects such as death, injury, or physical de-
struction,6 can still qualify as an “attack” under IHL and, thus, be limited by
its principles of distinction and proportionality in armed conflict. To this
subset of cyber operations, I will refer to as “disruptive cyber operations”.
Until now all recent efforts to address the threat of cyber warfare have
focused on the effects of cyberspace activities. For example, efforts have
questioned whether the effects were physical or non-physical, severe or less
severe, violent or non-violent. While it is clear existing international law
norms will cover severe forms of cyber operations, it is not clear what norms
apply to non-destructive cyber operations – i.e. those that do not result in
death, injury, or physical destruction.
While destructive cyber operations have little trouble being governed by
IHL principles of distinction and proportionality, disruptive cyber operations
are not necessarily governed by these principles. This is because there is no
official or widely accepted definition of disruptive cyber operations. Gener-
ally, however, disruptive cyber operations are cyber operations that “inter-
rupt the flow of information or the function of information systems without
causing physical damage or injury”.7 An example could be a cyber operation
that interrupts the access to the Internet or other information systems, which
does not result in direct death, injury, or physical destruction.
IHL has yet to be adapted to this increasingly ubiquitous part of contem-
porary armed conflict despite the indirect effects of disruptive cyber opera-
tions potentially having devastating consequences. The massive
manipulation and interruption of systems and information flow was previ-
ously unattainable through traditional means of warfare. But today, these
manipulations and interruptions are not only possible through traditional
means of warfare, but modern societies have also become much more depen-
5. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(2)(a)(iv), July 17,
1998, reprinted in 8 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 227, 232 (1999) (defining as a war crime, and prohib-
iting, “Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.”); id. at art. 8(2)(b)(ii), reprinted in 8 J. INT’L L. &
PRAC. 227, 233 (1999) (prohibiting “Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects,
that is, objects which are not military objectives.”) id. at art. 8(2)(b)(v), reprinted in 8 J. INT’L
L. & PRAC. 227, 233 (1999) (prohibiting “Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means,
towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military
objectives.”).
6. See NILS MELZER, CYBERWARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (United Nations
Inst. for Disarmament Research ed., 2011), available at http://unidir.org/files/publications/
pdfs/cyberwarfare-and-international-law-382.pdf.
7. Gary Brown & Owen Tullos, On the Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations, SMALL
WARS JOURNAL (Dec. 11, 2012, 5:30 AM), www.smallwarsjournal.com/print/13595.
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dent on these information systems. This explains why these disruptive cyber
operations have become an integral part of nearly every recent armed con-
flict, and why the legal questions of these operations must be answered.8
This paper will argue that cyberspace has allowed for a new form of
violence to emerge – violence that is enabled by the digital era, and that
causes major disruptive effects to modern societies. To combat this new
form of violence, disruptive cyber-attacks must be incorporated in the ambit
of IHL in order to protect civilians and civilian objects. Once incorporated
into IHL, if a disruptive cyber operation is deemed “violent” enough to be
considered an “attack,” the operation would be constrained by the principles
of distinction and proportionality. The result would be that the cyber initiator
of such attacks will be required to design the cyber operation humanely. This
would mean that the code and target of the operation must be sophisticated
enough to distinguish between civilians and combatants, military and civil-
ian objectives, and cause only proportionate collateral damage. As the reli-
ance on cyberspace, the internet of things, and data is becoming essential in
nearly every society, limiting the instances in which disruptive cyber opera-
tions can be used is necessary to promote the proper functioning of society
and to provide guidance to adversaries who wish to use disruptive cyber
operations in armed conflict.
Section II will introduce the relevant norms and principles within IHL,
and discuss the current debates on the nuances of these principles. Section
III will (1) introduce the concept of disruptive cyber operations; (2) argue
that these operations are in fact a new form of violence; and (3) apply ac-
cepted methods of treaty interpretation to establish a new norm to governing
what qualifies as an “attack” under IHL. Section IV will discuss the norma-
tive and practical implications of allowing certain disruptive cyber opera-
tions to be included in the definition of “attack” under IHL. This section will
(1) introduce the “duty to code humanely;” (2) offer a different perspective
of the proportionality analysis; (3) discuss the targeting of data in these
cyber operations; and (4) discuss current international and domestic legal
frameworks, that have addressed the challenges of disruptive cyber
operations.
II. “ATTACKS” UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
IHL is a body of international law that applies during armed conflicts.9
It is often synonymously referred to in Latin as “Jus in Bello” or “law in
8. See MARCO ROSCINI, CYBER OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE 165 (2014).
9. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 2-3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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war.” IHL, therefore, is the set of norms and principles that regulates the
conduct of parties to an armed conflict.10
Armed conflicts can be either international armed conflicts (“IACs”),11
between two or more states, or non-international armed conflicts (“NIACs”),
between states and armed groups or between armed groups within a state.12
The principles of distinction and proportionality, which are part of custom-
ary international law, and which apply to both IACs and NIACs, are only
applicable to activities that qualify as “attacks.” Thus, only a subset of mili-
tary activities will be constrained by the principles of distinction and
proportionality.
“Attacks”  are defined as “acts of violence against the adversary,
whether in offense or in defense” by Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I
of the Geneva Conventions.13 The existence of an “armed conflict”“ is a
prerequisite for applying the principles of distinction and proportionality to
“attacks.” Thus, it is critical to understand when an act can be considered an
“attack.”
The term “attack” has received several definitions from countries and
bodies around the world. For example, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (“ICRC”) commentary to Additional Protocol I and the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) have found
that the term “attack” means combat action.14 Meanwhile, Heather Dinniss’
highly cited commentary argues “attacks” do not include the dissemination
of propaganda, embargoes, or other non-physical means of psychological or
economic warfare since Article 49’s definition of attacks as “acts of vio-
lence” denotes physical force.15
Cyber operations exacerbate the difficulty in defining the precise scope
of “attacks” under IHL.16 This is primarily because the debate focuses on
10. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, What are Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello?(Jan. 22,
2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0.
11. See INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” DE-
FINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1 (2009), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf (defining IACs as “those which oppose
“High Contracting Parties” meaning states.”).
12. Id. at 3.
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 49(1), June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc.
A/32/144, available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0321.pdf [herein-
after AP I].
14. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF
8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 para. 1880 (Yves Sandoz et
al. eds., 1987), available at https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_
Protocols.pdf [hereinafter The Commentary]; See Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T,
Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 31, 2005).
15. MICHAEL BOTHE ET AL., NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: COMMEN-
TARY ON THE TWO 1977 PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 1949 289
(1982).
16. See HEATHER DINNISS, CYBER WARFARE AND THE LAWS OF WAR 197 (2012).
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whether non-destructive cyber operations can even be considered “attacks”
under IHL. There is, however, some precedent for IHL limiting certain ac-
tions due to their violent consequences even without a conventional manifes-
tation of physical force – for example, IHL limited the use of chemical and
biological weapons even though the deployment of these weapons does not
release violent kinetic forces.17 Given how the battlefield has changed dra-
matically since the language of Additional Protocol I was adopted back in
1977, IHL has at times adapted to meet the needs of the international
community.
IHL experts have debated whether disruptive cyber operations can be
deemed “attacks” and whether the principles of distinction and proportional-
ity should only be applied to “attack” operations. For example, Yoram Din-
stein argues that cyber operations are to be considered as “attacks” only “if
they engender violence through their effects”.18 He believes that a simple
firewall breach or virus dissemination is not enough,19 while “shutting down
a life-sustaining software programme or bring[ing] about serious damage to
property” would qualify the cyber operation as an attack.20 A contrary view
held by Nils Melzer, Legal Adviser of the ICRC, believes that the substan-
tive principles of distinction and proportionality should apply to the broader
hostilities, rather than the narrow form of operations that qualify as “at-
tacks,”21 arguing that “the applicability of the restraints imposed by IHL on
the conduct of hostilities to cyber operations depends not on whether the
operations in question qualify as “attacks” . . . but on whether they constitute
part of ‘hostilities’ within the meaning of IHL.”22
Additionally, ICRC Deputy Head of Legal Division, Knut Dörmann,
holds a different view,23 arguing that “neutralization” should be part of the
scope of “attack” due to its inclusion in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol
I, which provides that –
“Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as
objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those ob-
jects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effec-
17. See MICHAEL SCHMITT, “ATTACK” AS A TERM OF ART IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE
CYBER OPERATIONS CONTEXT 290 (C. Czosseck et al. eds., 2012), available at https://ccdcoe
.org/publications/2012proceedings/5_2_Schmitt_AttackAsATermOfArt.pdf, (referencing Pro-
tocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65.
18. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL ARMED
CONFLICT 2 (3d ed. 2016).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See MELZER, supra note 6, at 26.
22. See MELZER, supra note 6, at 26.
23. KNUT DÖRMANN, APPLICABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS TO COMPUTER
NETWORK ATTACKS 6 (2001), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/appli-
cabilityofihltocna.pdf.
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tive contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at
the time, offers a definite military advantage”.24
Dörmann also argues that “In literature it is sometimes claimed that the use
of CNA expands the range of legitimate targets because it enables attacks
with reversible effects against otherwise prohibited objects. If this claim im-
plies that an attack against a civilian object may be considered lawful if the
attack does not result in destruction or if its effects are reversible, this claim
is unfounded under existing law”.25 While Dörmann’s intention of protection
of civilians and civilian objects from neutralizing cyber operations is desira-
ble, it does not necessarily follow given the language of Article 52(2), which
only deals with military objectives.26
In 2011, the ICRC released a statement at the U.N. General Assembly,
reaffirming the importance of IHL compliance with regards to cyber
warfare:
[T]he ICRC draws the attention of States to the potential humanita-
rian consequences of cyber warfare, that is the resort to computer
network attacks during armed conflict situations. Such conse-
quences may include disastrous scenarios such as air traffic control
systems being interfered with and causing airplanes to collide or
crash, disruption of the electricity or water supplies for the civilian
population, or damage to chemical or nuclear facilities. The ICRC
therefore recalls the obligation of all parties to conflicts to respect
the rules of international humanitarian law if they resort to means
and methods of cyber warfare, including the principles of distinc-
tion, proportionality and precaution.27
This quote illustrates the ICRC’s serious concern about the potential human-
itarian consequences of cyber operations and makes an argument for how,
regardless of the medium used for executing an action, any type of operation
should still require compliance with distinction, proportionality, and precau-
tion. To better understand the restrictions imposed on “attacks”, the next
sections will discuss distinction, indiscriminate attacks, and proportionality.
24. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 52(2).
25. DÖRMANN, supra note 24, at 5.
26. See DINNISS, supra note 16, at 198 (providing a counterargument to Dörmann’s
assertions).
27. U.N. Gen. Assembly, General Debate on All Disarmament and International Secur-
ity Agenda Items, 66th Sess., First Committee, items 87 & 106 of the agenda, statement by the
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, New York (October 11, 2011), available at https://www.icrc
.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/united-nations-weapons-statement-2011-10-11.htm.
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A. Distinction
IHL seeks to protect civilians from “the calamities of war” by creating a
distinction between civilians and combatants, military objectives, and civil-
ian objects.28 The basic rule of distinction in Article 48 of Additional Proto-
col I provides that: “[p]arties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects
and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only
against military objectives.”29 The Commentary to Additional Protocol I ex-
plains that “operations” in the context of Article 48 includes “all movements
and acts related to hostilities that are undertaken by armed forces.”30
Distinction is a bedrock principle for the conduct of hostilities. Distinc-
tion obligates parties to direct their attacks to military targets and to spare
civilians and civilian objects. This principle also reinforces both humanita-
rian and strategic considerations due to direct attacks being permissible only
against military objectives. This is illustrated by Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I, which states that “[a]ttacks shall be limited strictly to military
objectives.”31 This means that “the civilian population as such, as well as
individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack”32 and that “civilian
objects shall not be the object of attack.”33
Any intentional violation of this principle of distinction is considered a
war crime under customary international law.34 It would therefore be illegal
to initiate a cyber operation directly targeting civilians, if the operation were
considered an “attack.”
While the case of destructive cyber operations as attacks is quite
straightforward, it does not extend to disruptive cyber operations. As noted
by Heather Dinniss –
it is common ground that computer network attacks which result in
physical damage to civilian property, injury or death to civilians
constitute attacks under international humanitarian law and are thus
prohibited. However, the status of computer network attacks di-
rected at civilian objects that do not result in such deleterious effects
remains the subject of debate.35
Excluding disruptive cyber operations from the scope of “attack” would
mean that civilians and civilian objects could legitimately become a direct
28. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under
400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, reprinted in 1 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 95-96 (Supp. 1907).
29. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 48.
30. The Commentary, supra note 14, at para. 1875.
31. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 52(2) (emphasis added).
32. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 51(2) (emphasis added).
33. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 52(1) (emphasis added).
34. Rome Statute, supra note 5, at arts. 8(2)(b)(i) & 8(2)(b)(ii).
35. DINNISS, supra note 17, at 197.
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target of disruptive cyber operations. This would be a strange outcome be-
cause the ICTY has explained there are no exceptions to the prohibition of
direct attacks against civilians and civilian objects, even if military necessity
required such attack to be made.36
B. Indiscriminate Attacks and Proportionality
In addition to protection from direct attacks, IHL also prohibits “indis-
criminate attacks”37 Indiscriminate attacks are “those which are not directed
at a specific military objective,”38 “employ a method or means of combat
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective,”39 or employ meth-
ods and means of combat the effects of which cannot distinguish between
protected and military targets.40
The prohibition against indiscriminate attacks is essential because it al-
lows attacks to be prohibited if they fall under the definition of “indiscrimi-
nate attacks,” even if the attack is not directed at civilians or civilian
objects.41 This is of particular concern for cyber operations, which include
poorly designed viruses and worms that do not distinguish between identities
of their targets,42 as well as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks,
which can affect untargeted civilians.43
The indiscriminate attack prohibition only applies to operations that are
considered “attacks” under IHL. Therefore it is important to establish disrup-
tive cyber operations as “attacks.”.
C. Proportionality
IHL adds another layer of protection to civilians and civilian objects,
even if an attack was not directed at a civilian or civilian object, and even if
the employed methods were capable of discriminating between protected
and unprotected targets. IHL assumes that even if these attacks do not target
a civilian or civilian object and discriminate between protected and unpro-
tected targets, incidental damage to civilians and civilian objects is still pos-
36. See Prosecutor v. Galiæ, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment, ¶ 130 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 1996).
37. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 51(4) (emphasis added).
38. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 51(4)(a).
39. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 51(4)(b).
40. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 51(4)(c).
41. See DINSETIN, supra note 19, at 127.
42. See Yoran Dinstein, The Principle of Distinction and Cyber War in International
Armed Conflicts, 17 J. CONF. & SEC. L. 261, 267 (2012).
43. Vangie Beal, DDoS Attack: Distributed Denial of Service, WEBOPEDIA, http://www
.webopedia.com/TERM/D/DDoS_attack.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2016) (“[I]n a DDoS attack,
the incoming traffic flooding the victim originates from many different sources — potentially
hundreds of thousands or more. This effectively makes it impossible to stop the attack simply
by blocking a simple IP address; plus, it is very difficult to distinguish legitimate user traffic
from attack traffic when spread across so many points of origin.”).
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sible. Therefore, for additional protection, Article 51(5)(b) provides that “an
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury
to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated” is indiscriminate, and therefore, illegal.44 This principle is com-
monly referred to as “proportionality”, and along with distinction represents
the fundamental principles of modern IHL.45
Article 51(5)(b) notably uses damage as opposed to destruction, which
broadens the scope of its applicability as damage means “harm . . .  impair-
ing the value or usefulness of something”46 and therefore inclusive of an act
or acts “disrupting the functioning of certain systems by interfering with
their underlying computer systems can amount to damage insofar as it im-
pairs their usefulness”.47
Yet even after determining the principle of proportionality ought to ap-
ply to cyber operations, cyber operations still pose a great challenge to the
principle of proportionality. Military advantage is often complicated to cal-
culate, and might be either biased or arbitrary, but assessing collateral dam-
age after a conventional military operation is relatively straightforward. The
same cannot be said for cyber operations. After all, once a malicious tool is
released, there is little to no control over the eventual exposure,48 and the
subsequent physical, economic and societal effects that such malicious tool
is capable of causing.49 Moreover, cyber operations blur the line between
collateral damage and inconveniences that are excluded from the scope of
collateral damage. Cyber operations can cause new types of harms, includ-
ing, but not limited to, disruption harms. However, the traditional rubric for
damage assessment does not properly weight the new types of harm pro-
duced by cyber attacks.
Another critical difficulty is determining the temporal scope of the col-
lateral damage anticipated. Since the effects of cyber operations can often
materialize when certain time has elapsed, the exact proximity of the effects
to the initial operation is highly ambiguous,50 and this gap might be used by
44. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 51(5)(b) (emphasis added).
45. ROSCINI, supra note 8, at 219.
46. Cordula Droege, Get off My Cloud: Cyber Warfare, International Humanitarian
Law, and the Protection of Civilians, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 533, 559 (2012).
47. Id.
48. See DINNISS, supra note 17, at 203 (“Viruses and worms are two methods of com-
puter network attack which are particularly likely to fall into this category [of indiscriminate
attacks] as their effects are often not limited by their creators.”).
49. See Karine Bannelier-Christakis, Is the Principle of Distinction Still Relevant in
Cyberwarfare?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CYBERSPACE 343,
349-350 (Nicholas Tsagourias & Russell Buchan, eds., 2015) (comparing states with varying
degrees of reliance upon cyberspace as a factor affecting the expected collateral damage).
50. Id. at 350.
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some actors to claim that certain harms are too distant to be linked to the
initial operation.
III. DISRUPTIVE CYBER OPERATIONS AS A NEW FORM OF VIOLENCE
On May 2009, President Obama made a speech regarding the U.S.
Cyber-Security Plan. During that speech he stated that cyber tools such as
spyware, malware, spoofing, phishing, and botnets are all “weapons of mass
disruption.”51 Weapons have always been considered to be destructive in
nature. With his play on the more familiar term “weapons of mass destruc-
tion, Obama highlighted the different character of cyber threats while simul-
taneously underscoring the potential for certain cyber tools to cause
wholesale destruction.
Modern weapons are now used for strategic and coercive purposes, may
support ongoing military operations, or may have a sole purpose of causing
harm, fear, and panic by terrorist organizations. There is now a new form of
violence, not necessarily kinetic but more than a mere inconvenience.
So, what are “disruptive cyber operations?”
A. Scope of “Disruptive”
The scope of “disruptive” is best described by its contrast to “destruc-
tive.” Disruptive cyber operations do not directly cause kinetic effects. Ki-
netic effects are either absent or cannot be causally linked to the initial cyber
operation. Destructive cyber operations, however, directly cause kinetic
effects.
While there is no widely recognized or otherwise authoritative definition
of “disruptive cyber operations” there are some proposed definitions that are
helpful in understanding the effects of “disruption.” For example, the Na-
tional Initiative for Cybersecurity Careers and Studies (NICCS) defines “dis-
ruption” in its glossary as “[a]n event which causes unplanned interruption
in operations or functions for an unacceptable length of time.”52 The Michi-
gan Cyber Disruption Response Strategy describes it as “an event that is
likely to cause, or is causing, harm to critical functions and services across
the public and private sectors by impairing the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability, of electronic information, information systems, services, or net-
works; and/or threaten public safety, undermine public confidence, have a
negative effect on the state economy, or diminish the security posture of the
state.”53 Another definition, advanced by Brown and Tullos, simply provides
51. David Sanger & John Markoff, Obama Outlines Coordinated Cyber-Security Plan,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/30/us/politics/30cyber
.html?_r=0.
52. Explore Terms: A Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology, NICCS https://
definedterm.com/a/download/document/11128 (last updated Feb. 10, 2015).
53. STATE OF MICHIGAN EXECUTIVE OFFICE, MICHIGAN CYBER DISRUPTION RESPONSE
STRATEGY: PROTECTING MICHIGAN’S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS 1 (2013),
124 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 23:113
that a “cyber disruption” is an action to “interrupt the flow of information or
the function of information systems without causing physical damage or
injury.”54
There are several key factors to these definitions of disruptive cyber
operations. First, there needs to be a certain event or incident beginning in
cyberspace. That means that either the operation is initiated with the use of
computer systems transmitting data packets, or a certain malicious tool is
created separately, and is then distributed physically.
Second, the harm needs to be of an interruptive nature. It must make
certain services, activities or functions unavailable as a result of the incident.
There can be a wide variety of functions affected including access to critical
information systems, access to the internet, access to certain computer net-
works, operating system malfunction. These effects, which are directly
caused by the cyber operation, can result in second-order and even third-
order effects.
Thirdly, the interruptive effects need to be of violent nature. Naturally,
certain disruptions are more severe than others.55 For example, taking down
critical governmental websites is far more serious than taking down an on-
line shopping website. Whether the disruption is violent will be determined
contextually and on a case-by-case basis. That determination, however,
should take into account three criteria: (1) the essentiality of the disrupted
target to the day-to-day civilian lives; (2) the scope of disruption, the amount
of individuals and organizations affected by the disruption; and (3) the dura-
tion of the operation, the presumption being that long-lasting effects are
more likely to be violent.
1. Interruption in internet access and other services
Disruption may include interruptions to the Internet or to other online
services. Access to the Internet and online services is essential to the proper




54. Brown & Tullos, supra note 8.
55. See Droege, supra note 47, at 559 (“Yet, an overly broad interpretation of the term
‘attack’ would mean that all interferences with civilian computer systems would amount to
attacks: the interruption of email or social network communications, of online booking or
shopping systems, etc. To equate such disruptions of what are essentially communication sys-
tems with attacks would probably go beyond the scope of what was envisaged by the rules on
the conduct of hostilities. These rules have traditionally sought to prevent damage to civilian
infrastructure that manifests itself in the physical world, not interference with propaganda,
communication, or economic life. In today’s world, the reliance of civilian life on communica-
tion systems blurs these lines, and it is not easy to distinguish between what is ‘mere’ commu-
nication and what goes beyond.”).
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Consider a DDoS attack targeting the Rutgers University network that
caused massive interruptions to Rutgers’ Internet services.56 University tools
used both by students and faculty were unavailable due to that cyber-at-
tack.57 This type of cyber operation that interrupts Internet access in a major
educational institution is disruptive and such disruption endangers the inter-
est of the proper functioning of an academic institution.
If such a disruptive cyber operation took place in an armed conflict con-
text, the consequences could be far-reaching. Therefore, it is vital to for IHL
to protect civilians and civilian objects from these types of operations, even
if there is no apparent destruction.
2. Functionality of computer systems
Disruptive cyber operations may also impair the functionality of com-
puter systems and networks. Cyber operations that affect functionality of
computers, computer systems, and networks may be causing effects very
briefly, temporarily, or permanently. If the loss of functionality requires the
replacement of hardware, then such cyber operation would be of destructive
nature, because it caused physical damage to the components of the targeted
computer system. If, however, such loss of functionality is due to a DDoS
attack that floods the targeted system with requests, making it inoperable,
the loss of functionality is either very brief, or temporary. Other types of
attacks can cause loss of functionality for longer periods of time, say, if the
tool used is a very sophisticated virus that interferes with proper functioning
of the target system.
The discussion on whether functionality of computer systems qualifies
as “attack” was debated by the International Group of Experts (IGE) of the
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare. The
Manual states –
[T]here was [an] extensive discussion about whether interference by
cyber means with the functionality of an object constitutes damage
or destruction for the purposes of this Rule. Although some Experts
were of the opinion that it does not, the majority of them were of the
view that interference with functionality qualifies as damage if res-
toration of functionality requires replacement of physical compo-
nents. Consider a cyber operation that is directed against the
computer-based control system of an electrical distribution grid.
The operation causes the grid to cease operating. In order to restore
distribution, either the control system or vital components thereof
must be replaced. The cyber operation is an attack. Those experts
56. See Vernal Coleman, Cyber Attack Causes Rutgers Internet Service Interruptions,
NJ.COM (Apr. 28, 2015, 10:23 AM), http://www.nj.com/middlesex/index.ssf/2015/04/cyber_at
tack_against_rutgers_causes_internet_servi.html.
57. Id.
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taking this position were split over the issue of whether the ‘dam-
age’ requirement is met in situations where functionality can be re-
stored by reinstalling the operating system.58
According to the Tallinn Manual experts, the loss of functionality can only
be an “attack” if it is  linked physical damage. This assertion, however,
misses the point of functionality of computer systems as a standalone value.
That is, we want to protect computer systems from functionality loss, regard-
less of physical damage that may or may not be linked to it.
3. Data manipulation, alteration, or deletion
Certain disruptive cyber operations might target data, whether the data
resides in certain computer systems, online or in classified networks. As UK
Cyber Security Strategy points out, “a growing number of adversaries are
looking to use cyberspace to steal, compromise or destroy critical data. The
scale of our dependence means that our prosperity, our key infrastructure,
our places of work and our homes can all be affected.”59 Data is becoming
central in nearly every society, and if compromised, it can pose a greater
threat to national security and the wellbeing of civilians in general.
The Tallinn Manual dealt with the scenario of data being the target of an
attack, presenting the opinion of few IGE members:
“A few Experts went as far as to suggest that interference with func-
tionality that necessitates data restoration, while not requiring physi-
cal replacement of components or reinstallation of the operating
system, qualifies as an attack. For these Experts, it is immaterial
how an object is disabled; the object’s loss of usability constitutes
the requisite damage”.
This, however, represents the minority view. The majority believes that
cyber operations that alter or destroy civilian data without generating these
consequences are not attacks under the current state of law, and are, in fact,
lawful.60
58. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 108 (Michael N. Schmitt ed. 2013).
59. UNITED KINGDOM CABINET OFFICE, THE UK CYBER SECURITY STRATEGY: PROTECT-
ING AND PROMOTING THE UK IN THE DIGITAL WORLD 15 (2011), available at https://www
.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60961/uk-cyber-security-
strategy-final.pdf.
60. See Michael Schmitt, The State of Humanitarian Law in Cyber Conflict, JUST SE-
CURITY (Jan. 6, 2015, 2:50 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/18891/state-humanitarian-law-
cyber-conflict/.
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Assuming data is an object, operations against civilian data would be
prohibited. The question of whether data can qualify as “civilian object,”
however, is subject to extensive debates.61
B. Modern Reinterpretation of Violence
The key to incorporate disruptive cyber operations within the scope of
“attack” under IHL is to interpret “acts of violence” as including cyber oper-
ations with disruptive effects. This is easily achieved because of society’s
dependence on information systems.62 Any tempering with the functionality
of these systems should be regarded as violence because it can be just as
harmful as the use of physical force.
The argument that “violence” is sufficiently broad to incorporate disrup-
tive activities and effects should be substantiated by contemporary interna-
tional law on treaty interpretation. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“VCLT”) provides the framework for interpreting treaties, as well
as the conclusion, observance, and application of treaties. Therefore, in order
to understand the term “violence,” to aid in the understanding of “attack”
and the inclusion of disruptive cyber operations in IHL, one must interpret it
within the VCLT framework.
1. General Rule of Interpretation
The “general rule of interpretation” according to the VCLT is textual.63
Article 31(1) of the VCLT reads as follows: “a treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and purpose.”64 The
International Court of Justice reaffirmed that if the ordinary meaning of a
term is clear, that should suffice for interpretational purposes.65 When the
61. For more on this debate, see, e.g., Michael Schmitt, The Notion of ‘Objects’ during
Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 ISR. L.
REV. 81 (2015) (arguing that data should not be characterized as an object in itself); Kubo
Macak, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpretive Computer Data as Objects under
International Humanitarian Law, 48 ISR. L. REV. 55 (2015) (arguing that data out to be an
‘object’); Heather Harisson Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the Chal-
lenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 ISR. L. REV. 39 (2015) (arguing that data
should be recognized as object to better protect civilians).
62. See NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW,
AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 253-54
(William A. Owens et al. eds., 2009).
63. See BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 379 (James Crawford
ed., 8th ed. 2012).
64. Vienna Concention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
65. See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 5, 8 (May 30) (“if the relevant words in their natural and ordinary
meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter.”).
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ordinary meaning is unclear, however, Article 31(2) of the VCLT provides
sources that may be used to aid the interpretation.66
a. Violence Generally
The basic premise of the law of treaties is that natural and ordinary
meaning of terms is the first step in the process of interpreting treaties. The
Oxford Dictionary defines “violence” as a “the deliberate exercise of physi-
cal force against a person, property, etc.; physically violent [behavior] or
treatment; (Law) the unlawful exercise of physical force, intimidation by the
exhibition of such force.”67 The French definition of ‘violence’, which is
equally authoritative as the English one,68 is defined inter alia as physical or
moral coercion, exerted on a person with the purpose of inducing him to
perform a certain action.69 As evidenced by these definitions includes ac-
tions that are not necessarily physically forceful.
The ordinary meaning of treaty terms is often insufficient to establish
authoritative interpretation. Therefore, interpretation sometimes requires an
examination of the context, including relevant treaty text, preambles, and
annexes. The argument that “violence” should be interpreted broadly is sup-
ported by Article 51(1) of Additional Protocol I, which provides that “the
civilian population and individual civilians shall enjoy general protection
against dangers arising from military operations.”70 The Commentary de-
fines military operations as “all the movements and activities carried out by
66.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the par-
ties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) Any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instru-
ment related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) Any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation
of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between
the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so in-
tended. VCLT, supra note 65, at art. 31(2).
67. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
68. See VCLT, supra note 65, art. 33(1) (“When a treaty has been authenticated in two
or more languages, the text is equally authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides
or the parties agree that, in case ofdivergence, a particular text shall prevail.”).
69. DICTIONNAIRE DE FRANÇAIS, LAROUSSE, available at http://www.larousse.fr/dic-
tionnaires/francais/violence/82071?q=violence#81105 (“Contrainte, physique ou morale, ex-
ercée sur une personne en vue de l’inciter à réaliser un acte déterminé.”).
70. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 51(1) (emphasis added).
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armed forces related to hostilities,” and explains that “there is no doubt that
armed conflicts entail dangers for the civilian population, but these should
be reduced to a minimum.”71 Additionally, Article 57(1) of Additional Pro-
tocol I states: “[i[n the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be
taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects.”72
Though in that case, several experts make the argument that “military opera-
tions” and “attacks” are synonyms, which signifies that “military operations”
is not broader in scope compared to “attacks.”73 In both provisions, the term
“attack” is not used, suggesting that civilians ought to be protected from a
wide array of operations.
In a different context, “cyber violence” (also known as “online bully-
ing”) was recently compared by the U.N. to physical violence: “cyber vio-
lence is just as damaging . . . as physical violence.”74 That is an example of
how cyberspace changes the traditional notion of violence, and given that
violence can take a multitude of forms other than physical.
b. Violence in Cyberspace
So, what constitutes violence in cyberspace? Obviously, not all cyber-
space operations or activities are “violent” by their nature. Certain cyber
operations or activities may be violent, however, if they cause kinetic effects
or if they cause disruptive effects. Therefore, in cyberspace, violence is any
effect that is either kinetic or disruptive.75
Thomas Rid, leading cyber warfare scholar and author of “Cyber War
Will Not Take Place” tackled this very question. Rid reached the conclusion
that cyber operations are almost always non-violent.76 Rid recognized that
cyberspace might be changing the notion of violence, and that it depends on
where the line is drawn between violence and non-violence.77 Rid’s narrow
reading of violence is what leads him to the conclusion that cyber operations
are non-violent in nature, as their violent effects are only materializing indi-
rectly.78 His conclusion, though contrary to the argument in this paper, is apt,
71. The Commentary, supra note 14, at paras. 1935–36.
72. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 57(1) (emphasis added).
73. Schmitt, supra note 61, at 93.
74. Charlotte Alter, U.N. Says Cyber Violence is Equivalent to Physical Violence
Against Women, TIME (Sept. 24, 2015), http://time.com/4049106/un-cyber-violence-physical-
violence/ (“The U.N. defines violence against women as “any act of gender-based violence
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to
women, including threats of such acts.” The report notes that cyber violence is an extension of
that definition that includes acts like trolling, hacking, spamming, and harassment.”).
75. See SCHMITT, supra note 61, at 290 (“A careful reading of Additional Protocol I’s
prohibitions and restrictions on attacks discloses that the concern was not so much with acts
which were violent, but rather with those that have harmful consequences (or risk them), in
other words, violent consequences.”).
76. Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, 35 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 5, 11 (2012).
77. Id.
78. Id.
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due to him drawing the line between violence and non-violence based on
direct physical effects. Rid’s assertion that most cyber operations are not
violent (i.e., lacking physical effects) is correct. However, that should lead to
the conclusion that IHL should address these operations when directed
against civilians. Therefore, the inclusion of these operations within the
scope of “attack” is necessary in order to avoid a scenario where these oper-
ations are used widely against civilians, with no restriction on IHL’s behalf.
Nils Melzer illustrated the difficulty in drawing a line between violence
and non-violence. He stated that “it would hardly be convincing to exclude
the non-destructive incapacitation of a state’s air defense system or other
critical military infrastructure from the notion of attack simply because it
does not directly cause death, injury or destruction.” As persuasive as Mel-
zer’s perspective is, it does not solve the disruptive cyber operations
question.79
i. Diffusion of Power in Cyberspace
There are two broader phenomena that should be noted with regard to
the changing notion of violence in cyberspace: (1) diffusion of power in
cyberspace; and (2) cyberspace allows for a broader spectrum of violence.
The first is the diffusion of power in cyberspace. States no longer have a
monopoly over power when it comes to cyberspace and more non-state enti-
ties are becoming involved in cyberspace activities on a large-scale. Joseph
Nye eloquently summarized it by saying that “[a]nyone from a teenage
hacker to a major modern government can do damage in cyber space”,80
While states will remain the dominant actor on the world stage, they will
find the stage far more crowded and difficult to control.81
This phenomenon could imply that states should be in favor of broaden-
ing the scope of “acts of violence.” States should support this because a
variety of non-state actors may exploit this lacuna by carrying out disruptive
cyber operations against civilians and escaping any accountability that IHL
could have imposed.82 International law, which is based mostly on the cen-
79. Droege, supra note 47, at 555 (“Melzer’s argument is attractive in that it gives effect
to the very object and purpose of the rules on the conduct of hostilities, which is that ‘innocent
civilians must be kept outside hostilities as far as possible and enjoy general protection against
danger arising from hostilities’. However, it leaves open the most critical question, namely
whether operations that disrupt civilian infrastructure without destroying it fall under the con-
cept of hostilities.”).
80. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., CYBER POWER 11 (Harv. Kennedy Sch., Belfer Center for Sci.
and Int’l Aff. ed., 2010), available at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/cyber-power.pdf.
81. Id. at 1.
82. Even when the direct participation in hostilities framework is concerned (the frame-
work that deals with civilians who engage in hostilities, and whether their acts can result in
forfeiture of their protected status, thus making them targetable with lethal force), these non-
state actors who use disruptive cyber operations will not be targetable because disruptive cyber
operations against civilians will not reach the threshold of harm provided by the framework
due to its focus on physical effects (death, injury, and physical destruction) on civilians. See
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trality of state sovereignty and the state monopoly on physical force,83
should keep up with the diffusion of power in cyberspace.
The second phenomenon provides that cyberspace allows for a broader
spectrum of violence to emerge. As a result, certain longstanding categories
are beginning to erode: “violence is no longer solely physical, distinctions
between violence inflicted by state and non-state actors is less clear, and
physical territory is less fundamental.”84 Some even claim that Internet itself
is a new form of violence.85 International law must change as violence in
cyberspace evolves.
2. Panama’s Proposal
On January 4, 1999, the U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution on
“[d]evelopments in the field of information and telecommunications in the
context of international security.”86 This resolution invited U.N. Member
States to submit responses to the Secretary General, informing their views.
(a) General appreciation of the issues of information security;
Ido Kilovaty, ICRC, NATO AND THE U.S. – Direct Participation in Hacktivities – Targeting
Private Contractors and Civilians in Cyberspace under International Humanitarian Law, 15
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1 (2016).
83. See SAMULI HAATAJA, TECHNOLOGY, VIOLENCE AND LAW: CYBER ATTACKS AND
UNCERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 319 (2013), available at http://www.academia.edu/
6776442/Technology_Violence_and_Law_Cyber_Attacks_and_Uncertainty_in_International_
Law (“Due to technological change, there has been a diffusion of power in cyberspace and
states are no longer able to maintain a monopoly of violence in this realm. Thus power rela-
tionships are changing, though international law remains premised on a different technological
environment in which state power is supreme. As the technological change reflected in the
Estonia incident demonstrates, a new technological environment has been made apparent in
which states are no longer the sole actors capable of engaging in an effective form of wide
scale violence. Nor is it always clear when a state is involved in acts of violence as the current
technological environment makes it easy to mask one’s identity and thus blurs traditional legal
distinctions of acts for which states may be responsible for. Consequently, there is not just
uncertainty about how existing legal doctrine on state responsibility should apply or what legal
regime cyber attacks should be categorised into. There is also uncertainty as to the ability of
international law, structured around the centrality of sovereign states and based on the assump-
tion that states are the only actors technologically capable of maintaining a monopoly of vio-
lence, to regulate behaviour in cyberspace where power is more diffused, violence is no longer
solely physical, distinctions between violence inflicted by state and non-state actors is less
clear, and physical territory is less fundamental. This raises questions about the significance of
territoriality, physicality and violence to sovereignty and international law, and reinvigorates
one of the central concerns of international law – its ability to control international violence.”).
84. Id. at 320.
85. Merritt Baer, Cyber Disarmament Treaties and the Failure to Consider Adequately
Zero-Day Threats, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INFORMA-
TION WARFARE AND SECURITY 255, 257 (Doug Hart ed., 2013).
86. G.A. Res. 53/70, U.N. Doc. A/RES/53/70 (Jan. 4, 1999).
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(b) Definition of basic notions related to information security, in-
cluding unauthorized interference with or misuse of information
and telecommunications systems and information resources;
(c) Advisability of developing international principles that would
enhance the security of global information and telecommunica-
tions systems and help to combat information terrorism and
criminality.87
On June 24, 2002, Panama submitted its response to the Secretary Gen-
eral, which although brief, managed to present several highly persuasive
propositions. First, Panama argued that the focus on kinetic effects of cyber
operations is flawed, because today computers regulate many critical aspects
such as emergency services, air traffic, and financial information, and there-
fore, “an attack in which new information and telecommunications technolo-
gies are employed may cause more damage than, for instance, a
conventional bombardment.”88 Second, Panama argues that this threat “re-
quires protection systems tailored to this new form of violence.” Panama is
correct in the assumption that new types of attacks, using information and
telecommunications technologies, can cause more harm than conventional
attacks.
The core of Panama’s proposal is to rethink violence. Violence in the
modern, digital age is a different phenomenon entirely compared to tradi-
tional forms of violence. While Panama does not argue in the context of
IHL, its argument is helpful in the sense that the “ordinary meaning” of
violence is changing. This idea supports the notion that disruptive cyber op-
erations should be included in the scope of “attack.”
IV. NORMATIVE AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
DISRUPTION AS “ATTACKS”
Including disruptive cyber operations within the ambit of “attack” has a
variety of normative and practical implications. The most obvious is that
they cannot be directed at civilians or civilian objects. But there are addi-
tional, less obvious implications, which must be acknowledged. First, it
would make disruptive cyber operations subject to the duty to code hu-
manely, to design all cyber operations, whether disruptive or destructive, in a
way that discriminates between military and civilian targets. Second, it is
essential to rethink the proportionality equation. Illegitimating civilian dis-
ruption harm under the auspices of IHL leads to its inclusion under the pro-
portionality analysis, which typically seeks to limit collateral damage to
87. Id. at 2.
88. Panama’s Response to Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommuni-
cations in the Context of International Security, G.A. Res. A/57/166/Add.1, at 5 (Aug. 29,
2002).
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civilians, and; Third, the argument made by this paper should be compared
and contrasted to existing frameworks dealing with similar issues, namely
the U.S. Department of Defense Law of War Manual, The Tallinn Manual,
and the UN Governmental Group of Experts Report.
A. The Duty to Code Humanely
The duty to code humanely implies that parties to a conflict are under
obligation to design their cyber operations in accordance with the prohibi-
tion on indiscriminate attacks. As discussed above, the prohibition is con-
cerned with attacks that are unable to discriminate between military and
civilian targets. When attacks are unable to discern between military and
civilian targets, it increases the likelihood of harming civilian targets. In or-
der to distinguish between protected civilians and ilitary targets, adversaries
will be required to take additional steps to ensure compliance. .89
If disruptive cyber operations are indeed “attacks,” then the prohibition
on indiscriminate attacks would apply to these cyber operations as well.
Therefore, the duty to code humanely is applicable to a broader set of cyber
operations. That is, not only destructive cyber operation, but also disruptive
cyber operations. This broad inclusion is making the determination of IHL
compliance easier, since coding humanely is to be a prerequisite of nearly all
cyber operations. In addition, this may set the standard of due diligence in
designing cyber operations, which is so desperately needed today.90
The U.S. Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual does not use
“attack” when defining “discrimination,” in the context of IHL, by providing
that:
Discrimination requires combatants to differentiate between enemy
combatants, who represent a threat, and noncombatants, who do not.
In conventional operations, this restriction means that combatants
cannot intent to harm noncombatants, though proportionality per-
mits them to act, knowing some noncombatants may be harmed.91
A “humane” cyber operation is one in which the operation is designed to
only cause harm to specified computer systems and networks. For example,
89. See AP I, supra note 13, at art. 51(4).
90. See Michael Schmitt, In Defense of Due Diligence in Cyberspace, Yale Law Journal
Forum (Jun. 22, 2015) – “Furthermore, although the precise threshold of harm at which the
duty arises is unclear in law,37 there has been no suggestion from any quarter that the duty
extends to mere irritation or inconvenience, such as defacement and temporary minor denials
of service. Rather, harm must rise to such a level that it becomes a legitimate concern in inter-
state relations and, thus, an appropriate subject of international law rights and obligations.”,
quoting Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1911, 1963 (Arb. Trib. 1941),
available at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/in-defense-of-due-diligence-in-cyberspace.”
91. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY AND MARINE CORPS COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD
MANUAL 7-7, para. 7-34 (2006), available at http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/Repository/Materi-
als/COIN-FM3-24.pdf.
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if it is known that a certain military objective uses computer systems of a
particular manufacturer, having very specific software and properties, it will
be easier to design a human cyber operation that will only cause effects to
computer systems meeting these parameters, while others will be spared.
That will give effect to the protection from indiscriminate attacks, and will
enhance the discriminative aspect of cyber operations.92 As summarized by
Bill Boothby, leading IHL expert and Deputy Director of Legal Services at
the British Royal Air Force:
[T]he critical issue . . . is whether the cyber weapon limits its dam-
aging effect reasonably to the intended target, that is, to the cyber
node or to the part of the network that is the military objective. In
this regard, for example, worms, viruses and other malware that
spread their effects uncontrollably may cause damage to other, ci-
vilian computer systems, and if the consequence is that their nature
is to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects with-
out distinction, then the cyber weapon will be indiscriminate by na-
ture and thus unlawful.93
Duncan Hollis, law professor at Temple University and IHL expert adds that
“malware of various types can quickly be distributed world-wide. Without
careful planning cyber operations may be indiscriminate or cause harms
greater than expected or necessary to achieve their military objective.”94
That connects to a possible problem related to lack of careful planning of
cyber operations, which can ultimately harm unintended targets, while also
violating bedrock principles of IHL.
Lack of careful planning can also lead to loss of control over the initial
cyber operation, because once viruses or worms are unleashed, they “can
quickly spiral out of control, infiltrating civilian systems and causing dam-
age to property that far surpasses the intent of the cyber attacker.”95 Careful
planning stems from a commander’s obligation to make a decision based on
92. See Eric Jensen, Cyber Attacks: Proportionality and Precautions in Attack, 89 INT’L
L. STUD. 198, 203 (2013) (“When employing a cyber tool or conducting cyber operations, the
commander would need to maintain oversight of the tool and be ready to adjust operations if
the tool or operation began to have effects that the commander determined would have an
illegal impact on civilians. This might be especially difficult in the cyber domain since virtu-
ally every cyber operation will traverse, affect, employ or damage civilian cyber infrastructure
of some kind.”).
93. William H. Boothby, Where do Cyber Hostilities Fit in the International Law
Maze?, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 59, 68 (Hitoshi Nasu &
Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014).
94. Duncan B. Hollis, Re-Thinking the Boundaries of Law in Cyberspace: A Duty to
Hack?, in CYBER WAR: LAW AND ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 129, 170 (Jens David Ohlin
et al. eds., 2015).
95. Michael Gervais, Cyber Attacks and the Laws of War, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 525,
570 (2012).
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all available information, and to collect the best intelligence given the cir-
cumstances.96 It is based on the precaution in attack principle, which obli-
gates parties to an armed conflict to take feasible measures to ensure that
civilian targets are sufficiently protected.  The Additional Protocol I pro-
vides: “in the conduct of military operations, constant care shall be taken to
spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects”97 and therefore,
adversaries are requested to “take all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to
civilian objects”.98
The standard of the precaution principle is “feasibility,” meaning that
the required measures are “practicable or practically possible, taking into
account all the circumstance ruling at the time, including humanitarian and
military considerations.”99 In that regard, ICRC legal adviser Cordula
Droege posited that the precautionary principle “will require verifying the
nature of the systems that are being attacked and the possible damage that
might ensue from an attack. It also means that when it becomes apparent that
an attack will cause excessive incidental civilian damage or casualties, it
must be cancelled.”100 Droege argues that “the use of a worm that replicates
itself and cannot be controlled, and might therefore cause considerable dam-
age to civilian infrastructure, would be a violation of IHL.”101
Some experts claim that because disruptive cyber operations are non-
lethal there is incentive not to comply with IHL. Jeff Kelsey argued that “the
potentially non-lethal nature of cyber weapons may cloud the assessment of
an attack’s legality, leading to more frequent violations of the principle of
distinction in this new form of warfare than in conventional warfare.”102 This
illustrates that the duty to code humanely is critical to disruptive cyber oper-
96. See Dieter Fleck (ed.), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2013),
para. 443, comm. 7 (Stating that “Exact reconnaissance and the procurement of precise infor-
mation by military intelligence services become key factors of lawful warfare. The technologi-
cally and institutionally highly developed military organizations of the industrial states could
probably manage these requirements;338 military actors without efficient means of reconnais-
sance and intelligence, however, will encounter serious difficulties in meeting the require-
ments of Article 52, para. 2, AP I [requirement of attacks only against military objectives]
Also, stating that “The command authorities responsible for planning and deciding upon an
attack must employ all means of reconnaissance and intelligence available to them unless and
until there is sufficient certainty of the military nature of the objective of an attack”. )
97. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 57(1).
98. AP I, supra note 13, at art. 57(2)(a)(ii) (empahsis added).
99. HOLIS, supra note 95, at 160.
100. Cordula Droege, Legal Advisor, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, No Legal Vaccum
in Cyber Space (Aug. 16, 2011), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
interview/2011/cyber-warfare-interview-2011-08-16.htm.
101. Id.
102. Jeffrey T. G. Kelsey, Hacking into International Humanitarian Law: The Principles
of Distinction and Neutrality in the Age of Cyber Warfare, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1427, 1439
(2012).
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ations, even though it applies equally to destructive cyber operations. To
avoid this negative incentive to comply with IHL principles, disruptive ef-
fects need to be addressed and covered by IHL.
It must be noted, that even the best cyber operation designers may be
prone to human error and unforeseen consequences.103 This is, however, not
specific to cyber operations as errors may occur in the non-cyber realm as
well. If the cyber operation is designed humanely there is a reduced risk that
such operation will be indiscriminate.104 Additional challenge to the duty to
code humanely is the dual-use reality, in which many cyber infrastructure
targets are used both by civilians and the military. As eloquently described
by prominent IHL scholars Robin Geib and Henning Lahmann –
“Whereas it is technically possible to distinguish virtual targets in
cyberspace – meaning that a hyper-distinctive attack against a mili-
tary network is certainly realistic – the application of the accepted
legal definition of military objectives in the interconnected cyber
domain will render basically every cyber installation a legitimate
military objective. In cyberspace, every component of the cyber in-
frastructure is a dual-use object”.105
This challenge is not cyber-specific, as contemporary conflicts exacerbate
the difficulty to distinguish between military and civilian objectives.
1. Case study –  Stuxnet: Humane Cyber Operation
In 2010, the computer networks of the Iranian nuclear research facility
in Natanz were infected by a malware, which caused unexpected detrimental
physical destruction. The Stuxnet virus, which infected the Iranian nuclear
plant, caused damage to the uranium-enriching infrastructure by making the
centrifuges spin out of control up to the point that they become irreversibly
damaged. This was achieved by a so-called “semantic cyber attack,” which
manipulates the output of the targeted system, by showing incorrect informa-
103. See Erki Kodar, Applying the Law of Armed Conflict to Cyber Attacks: From the
Martens Clause to Additional Protocol I, 15 ENDC PROCEEDINGS 107, 121-22 (2012).
104. Id. at 121 (“The difficulty of cyber attacks is that, to be conducted legally, they have
to be of high sophistication so as not to violate the requirements of LOAC. But a cyber attack
can easily, either intentionally or through a human or technological mistake, transform into an
indiscriminate attack. If a belligerent programs a virus the sole purpose of which is to replicate
in IT systems, infect as many computers as possible and destroy all the data on infected ma-
chines, then it would be hard to argue that such a cyber attack is in accordance with LOAC. In
this example, the cyber attack (virus) would be uncontrollable and spread through military and
civilian systems alike, constituting an indiscriminate attack. Therefore, a cyber attack must be
of high sophistication and adhere to the principle of distinction and to LOAC in general.”).
105. Robin Geib & Henning Lahmann, Cyber Warfare: Applying the Principles of Dis-
tinction in an Interconnected Space, 45(3) ISR. L. REV. 381, 382-83 (2012).
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tion.106 As a result, the Stuxnet attack damaged the centrifuges, which were
spinning until they broke, while the computer systems of the facility showed
that the centrifuges operate normally.107
Stuxnet is an example of how diligent and “humane” design of a cyber
operation can end up achieving a military objective, without harming any
civilians or civilian objects. Stuxnet was very cleverly designed to only harm
computer systems manufactured by Siemens, having very specific configura-
tions, in order to limit the effects to the computers resident at the nuclear
plant in Natanz. When the worm infected these systems, it forced the cen-
trifuges to speed up to a speed that essentially destroys those centrifuges.
Otherwise, if the worm does not detect these specific configurations, it does
not cause any effects at all, other than just existing on that computer system.
In that context, experts concluded that “Stuxnet satisfies the criteria of dis-
tinction because the worm was designed for a specific military target – as-
suming the Natanz plant is not a civilian nuclear energy program – and did
not indiscriminately destroy civilian computer systems.”108
Stuxnet was not carried out in an armed conflict context, and, thus, was
not evaluated under IHL norms and principles. Similar operations could take
place during an armed conflict in the future, and it is then that the lessons
from Stuxnet may be valuable for the purposes of protecting civilians and
civilian objects from attacks. In addition, Stuxnet was both a disruptive and
destructive cyber operation. The disruptive part manipulated the computer
systems to show that the centrifuges are functioning properly, while the de-
structive resulted in irreversibly damage to the centrifuges. In that sense,
Stuxnet is not a purely disruptive cyber operation, and here again, lessons
regarding practice relating to disruptive cyber operations cannot be made
necessarily. Finally, Stuxnet infected a variety of additional targets, but these
were not damaged. Some claim that these “constant care” standard operation
may suggest an emerging state practice on the duty to code humanely.109
B. Rethinking the Proportionality Analysis
The proportionality analysis (discussed infra) compares military advan-
tage with incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civil-
ian objects, or a combination thereof (“collateral damage”) and prohibits
106. See MARTIN C. LIBICKI, WHAT IS INFORMATION WARFARE? 77 (1995) (“A system
under semantic attack operates and will be perceived as operating correctly, . . . but it will
generate answers at variance with reality.”).
107. See Oona Hathaway et al., The Law of Cyber-Attack, 100 CAL. L. REV. 817, 819,
828 (2012).
108. Gervais, supra note 96, at 571.
109. See Jensen, supra note 93, at 203 (“[R]eports show that it spread much wider than
that, presumably wider than the United States and Israel intended it to disseminate, which may
have led to its discovery. Though no other damage was reported, the unintended spread of the
virus at least implicates the constant-care standard and informs State practice on the issue.”).
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attacks that are expected to result in excessive collateral damage as opposed
to the military advantage anticipated.110 The meaning of the proportionality
analysis, is that even if the cyber operation was coded humanely, it still does
not mean that it is proportional.
If disruption is included in the scope of “attack,” then it is inevitable for
disruptive effects to be included as part of the collateral damage belonging to
the proportionality analysis. In literature, a proportionality analysis that takes
into account the disruption collateral damage is not uncommon.111 The rea-
son for that would be that simply including disruptive cyber operations
within the ambit of attacks would not protect civilians from these operations,
as it will be legal under IHL to cause disruptive incidental damage, if the
attack is discriminate and not directly carried out against civilians. The mat-
ter really boils down to whether destructive or disruptive cyber operations,
against military objectives should cause proportionate disruptive and other
damages to civilians and civilian objects.
Eric Jensen proposes that IHL consider collateral damage employing the
functionality approach.
[S]ome have taken the view that damage also encompasses serious
interruptions in functionality, such as would require replacing parts
or reloading software systems. For example, in the kinetic analogy
used above where a cyber attack shut down a communication port
but left the rest of the computer unaffected, the computer would still
turn on but its actual functionality might be seriously affected. If
functionality is considered when determining damage, the kinetic
analogy would be of limited value. The functionality approach
seems to be the best application of the proportionality rule to the
cyber realm as it takes into account the unique aspects of cyber
operations, without going so far as to make the proportionality anal-
ysis unwieldy for commanders to apply. Armed conflict has always
included effects on civilians that have caused inconvenience, irrita-
110. 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 46 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2005)
(“Proportionality in Attack: Rule 14. Launching an attack which may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated, is prohibited.”).
111. See Herb Lin, Cyber Conflict and International Humanitarian Law, 94 INT’L. REV.
RED CROSS 515, 526 (2012) (“Under the provisions related to proportionality, some degree of
collateral damage is allowable, but not if the ‘expected’ collateral damage is disproportionate
compared to the ‘anticipated military advantage’. 16 If, for example, a power plant is the target
of a cyber attack, an assessment must be made as to whether the harm to the civilian popula-
tion caused by disruption of electrical service is not disproportionate to the military advantage
that might ensue from attacking the plant. Before such an assessment could be made, the
commander would have to have adequate intelligence about the plant (and what was dependent
on the plant) on which to base the judgement.”).
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tion, stress and fear, but these have traditionally not been part of the
commander’s analysis of damage required by the proportionality
analysis. By focusing on functionality, the commanders can easily
understand the legal standard and apply it to modern cyber
operations.112
The functionality seems to make sense. It includes not only physical
collateral damage, but also damage in the form of loss of functionality,
whether “replacing parts or reloading software systems.” However, disrup-
tion that does require replacing parts or reloading software should be in-
cluded. For example, disruption due to a DDoS attack on a specific
governmental website does not result in reloading software or replacing any
hardware parts, but requires either waiting it out, or attacking the source(s)
of the DDoS attack to stop its disruptive effects.
The primary shortcoming of a narrow reading of collateral damage is
that the most severe disruptive cyber operations would be far more
humanitarianly dangerous than physical destroying a house belonging to a
civilian.113 That is to say, that disruption effects can be far more serious than
physical ones. In that sense, reconsidering the scope of collateral damage is
essential.
C. The Persistent Problem with Operations against Data
Data as a target of cyber operations poses a very specific, complicated
challenge. Even if we consider cyber operations targeting data as “attacks,”
the remaining question is whether data can constitute an “object,” because
112. Jensen, supra note 93, at 206-07.
113. See Geib & Lahmann, supra note 105105, at 397 (offering a similiar example, ex-
plaining that, “It would appear counter-intuitive that only the physical destruction of a civilian
object should be taken into consideration, whereas functionality loss – even if it affects the
civilian population much more severely – should be irrelevant. Indeed, a narrow reading of the
phrase ‘damage to civilian objects’ that is limited to physical destruction would lead to the
following result. Whereas the destruction of a single civilian car would amount to legally
relevant, albeit rather insignificant, ‘collateral damage’, the disconnection of thousands or mil-
lions of households, companies and public services from the internet or other communication
services, or the severance of online financial transactions for a country’s entire economy and
the corresponding economic and societal effects as such would not count as relevant elements
to be factored into the proportionality calculus. Only when and where these effects foreseeably
resulted in the loss of civilian life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects could they
be considered as factors relevant for the proportionality calculus.70 Given that it is extremely
difficult to determine in advance what the foreseeable physical effects of a large-scale attack
against cyber infrastructure components may be – in the interconnected domain of cyberspace
such operations may have a number of cascading effects that are hard to predict – the inclusion
of direct effects such as the loss of functionality into the list of proportionality-relevant factors
would greatly facilitate the application of the proportionality principle, especially in the cyber
domain. Evidently, the more cyber-reliant a society is – and in the future this reliance will only
increase in a growing number of states – the more detrimental the effects of such functionality
loss on the civilian population will be.”).
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the distinction principle only protects “civilian objects” from direct attacks.
The classification of data as an object (or non-object) is essential to its pro-
tection in the civilian context. In other words, critical civilian data may be
compromised if IHL fails to classify data as an object protected from direct
attacks.114
The absolute exclusion of data from the scope of “object” appears in the
Tallinn Manual. Rule 37 of the Tallinn Manual provides that “[c]ivilian ob-
jects shall not be made the object of cyber attacks. Computers, computer
networks, and cyber infrastructure may be made the object of attack if they
are military objectives.”115 Rule 38 of the Tallinn Manual adopts some of
Additional Protocol I provisions, and provides that:
Civilian objects are all objects that are not military objectives. Mili-
tary objectives are those objects which by their nature, location,
purpose, or use, make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in
the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military ad-
vantage. Military objectives may include computers, computer net-
works, and cyber infrastructure.116
The Tallinn Manual experts found that “the meaning of the term ‘object’
is essential in understanding this and other Rules found in the Manual. An
‘object’ is characterized in the ICRC Additional Protocols Commentary as
something ‘visible and tangible.’ ”117 The IGE continued their commentary
by adding that an “. . .object should not be interpreted as data. Data is intan-
gible and therefore neither falls within the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term
object.”118 This assertion is counterintuitive, and does not conform with
technological and societal developments taking place in the last few decades.
Similarly, Prof. Schmitt, argues that “data should not be characterized as
an object in itself.”119 Schmitt argues that operations against data could be a
violation of the principle of distinction if “the consequences attendant to its
114. For more on this debate, see, e.g., Michael Schmitt, The Notion of ‘Objects’ during
Cyber Operations: A Riposte in Defence of Interpretive and Applicative Precision, 48 ISR. L.
REV. 81 (2015) (arguing that data should not be characterized as an object in itself); Kubo
Macak, Military Objectives 2.0: The Case for Interpretive Computer Data as Objects under
International Humanitarian Law, 48 ISR. L. REV. 55 (2015) (arguing that data out to be an
‘object’); Heather Harisson Dinniss, The Nature of Objects: Targeting Networks and the Chal-
lenge of Defining Cyber Military Objectives, 48 ISR. L. REV. 39 (2015) (arguing that data
should be recognized as object to better protect civilians).
115. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 124.
116. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 125.
117. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 126 (Commentary 4 to Rule
38); see also INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 14, at para. 2008.
118. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 127 (Commentary 5 to Rule
38).
119. Schmitt, supra note 75, at 96.
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destruction involve the requisite level of harm to protected physical objects
or persons.”120 Although Schmitt’s approach on data as object might seem as
data-inclusive, it is in fact a data-exclusive. Schmitt argues that data should
be seen as object only if there are physical manifestations to the manipula-
tion or destruction of such data. Therefore, Schmitt does not view the data as
valuable for civilian knowledge, information, order and well-being, that is,
data as having an intrinsic value.121 In his riposte piece, Schmitt simply ar-
gued that “Since data is not an object, then on that basis it is not subject to
the prohibition on attacking civilian objects; it is instead necessary to look to
the consequences of its damage or destruction to determine whether the pro-
hibition applies.”122 That approach is somewhat dated, in the sense that digi-
tal data is a relatively new concept, when compared to the notions held by
IHL years  and years ago.123
Prof. Heather Dinniss, among the leading cyber warfare scholars, holds
a similar view, by arguing that code, that is, a type of data, “may qualify as a
military objective by providing an effective contribution to military action
either through its nature, location, purpose or use.”124 Dinniss argues that:
[I]n today’s world of increasing virtualisation and extensive interde-
pendence between military and civilian infrastructure, requiring tan-
gibility results in a manifestly unreasonable result. Such a result is
inconsistent with other treatments of intangibility in international
humanitarian law and contrary to the expressed purpose of provid-
ing effective protection to civilians and civilian objects.125
A minority among the International Group of Experts, as part of the
commentary to Rule 38 of the Tallinn Manual, argued that “data per se
should be regarded as an object. In their [minority Experts] view, failure to
do so would mean that even the deletion of extremely valuable and impor-
tant civilian datasets would potentially escape the regulatory reach of the law
120. Id.
121. See id. Though Schmitt does make some effort to address data with intrinsic value –
“some data have intrinsic value. An example would be digital art. If the data are destroyed, the
art is as well,” that approach is still under-inclusive as it disregards massive amounts of data
with intrinsic value that are not art.
122. Schmitt, supra note 75, at 97.
123. See Macak, supra note 114, at 67 (arguing that, in accordance with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), the term ‘object’ should be interpreted to encom-
pass data, by providing that Tallinn Manual’s use of ICRC Commentary definition of an object
as “visible and tangible” is dated, mainly because the possibility of cyber warfare, or even
digital data, did not cross the minds of the commentators in 1987. In addition, Macak argued
that the claim that data is an object is supported by teleological interpretation, as mandated by
the VCLT).
124. Dinniss, supra note 114, at 54.
125. Id.
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of armed conflict”.126 Since the Tallinn Manual required unanimity to adopt
its rules, the question on whether data could constitute object was unset-
tled.127 In addition, although the majority of Experts concluded that data is
not an object, Rule 71 of the Tallinn Manual seems to be contradicting that
assertion, by providing that “. . .data that form[s] an integral part of the
operations or administration of medical units and transports. . . may not be
made the object of attack”.128
These views are more persuasive than the data-excluding ones, yet the
shortcoming in the data-inclusive arguments presented here, is that they end
up being over-inclusive. Macak himself realizes that while “an innocuous e-
mail” belonging to a civilian is an object, and destruction of such letter
“would indeed probably not be lawful under IHL”, it is unlikely, according
to Macak, “that states would, within the scope of an armed conflict, engage
in a military operation the sole aim of which would be to destroy one civil-
ian letter (or one such email)”.129
Data should be viewed as an object as any other proposition would com-
promise data completely. The consideration whether the cyber operation
targeting data is an “attack” should rely on the three factors: (1) an operation
beginning in cyberspace or a computer system; (2) it is interruptive in nature
– that is, the compromise or loss of data is interrupting the day-to-day lives
of civilians; and (3) it is violent, that is, the data is critical, the damage is
irreversible, the effects are prolonged and more.
D. Existing Frameworks
Certain frameworks have already made attempts to address cyber opera-
tions in the context of IHL, particularly in relation to “attack.” Although
there is no internationally binding framework, these frameworks are impor-
tant in understanding the current view on these issues. The U.S. DoD Law of
War Manual represents the view of the Department of Defense alone,130
126. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 127 (Commentary 5 to Rule
38).
127. See Schmitt, supra note 114, at 82-83.
128. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 206.
129. Macak, supra note 114, at 75-76.
130. See generally Office of Gen. Counsel U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Department of De-
fense Law of War Manual 1005 (2015), available at available at http://www.defense.gov/Por-
tals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of- War-Manual- June-2015.pdf. (“This manual is an institutional
publication and reflects the views of the Department of Defense, rather than the views of any
particular person or DoD component. An effort has been made to reflect in this manual sound
legal positions based on relevant authoritative sources of the law, including as developed by
the DoD or the U.S. Government under such sources, and to show in the cited sources the past
practice of DoD or the United States in applying the law of war.”).
“This manual is an institutional publication and reflects the views of the Department of
Defense, rather than the views of any particular person or DoD component. An effort has been
made to reflect in this manual sound legal positions based on relevant authoritative sources of
the law, including as developed by the DoD or the U.S. Government under such sources, and
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though it might be used by other departments, as well as officially by the
U.S.
The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber War-
fare, is a NATO sponsored non-binding codification of the international law
norms applicable to the wartime use of cyber-attacks.131 The Tallinn Manual
deals, inter alia, with the IHL applicability to cyber warfare. However, even
though the Tallinn Manual represents lex lata, rather than lex ferenda, it is
not legally binding.132
The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Report on Developments in
the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of Interna-
tional Security, is an effort to bring experts from twenty different countries,
who “examined existing and potential threats arising from the use of ICTs
[information and communication technologies] by States. . . including
norms, rules, principles and confidence-building measures. . . the Group ex-
amined how international law applies to the use of ICTs by States. Building
on the work of previous Groups, the present Group made important progress
in those areas.”133
1. U.S. DoD Law of War Manual
The Law of War Manual begins its cyber operations and jus in bello
(IHL) part by stating the basic, and most obvious assumption: “[i]f a cyber
operation constitutes an attack, then the law of war rules on conducting at-
tacks must be applied to those cyber operations. For example, such opera-
tions must comport with the requirements of distinction and
proportionality”.134 On the contrary, the Manual posits that “a cyber opera-
tion that does not constitute an attack is not restricted by the rules that apply
to attacks. Factors that would suggest that a cyber operation is not an “at-
tack” include whether the operation causes only reversible effects or only
temporary effects. Cyber operations that generally would not constitute at-
tacks include: defacing a government webpage; a minor, brief disruption of
internet services; briefly disrupting, disabling, or interfering with communi-
cations; and disseminating propaganda.”135
to show in the cited sources the past practice of DoD or the United States in applying the law
of war.”
131. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 1.
132. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 5.
133. G.A. Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunication in the Context of International Security, 2, U.N. Doc. A/
70/150 (July 22, 2015) [hereinafter GGE Report].
134. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 131, at 1003-04 (Rule
16.5.1).
135. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 131, at 1005 (Rule
16.5.2).
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a. The Manual’s Shortcomings
There are two shortcomings in the Manual’s treatment of disruptive
cyber operations (or non-attack cyber operations). First, the Manual uses the
“reversible effects or only temporary effects” test,136 which does not neces-
sarily help determining whether a cyber operations reached the level of “at-
tack.” For example, a cyber operation that causes bodily injury or physical
destruction could still be reversible or temporary in its effects, yet it would
definitely be considered an “attack” due to its clear physical consequences.
Second, the examples provided by the Manual are “inconvenience” sort of
harms, which would not necessarily be considered as particularly disruptive
(depending on the degree of inconvenience), and the language used by the
Manual hints towards that notion – “defacing” and “minor, brief disruption”
is a language that denotes lack of violent effects, as argued earlier in this
paper, yet the Manual does not directly grapple with effects on functionality,
data, essential services, all of which, if targeted, could result in violent ef-
fects, thus invoking the IHL regime applicable to “attacks”. All in all, the
Manual seems to leave somewhat of a gap between cyber operations causing
minor inconveniences and ones that cause severe physical effects.
Furthermore, the Manual holds an opposing view to this paper’s main
argument, that disruptive cyber operations “may be directed at civilians or
civilian objects.” However, “such operations must not be directed against
enemy civilians or civilian objects unless the operations are militarily neces-
sary” and “even if a cyber operation is not an “attack” or does not cause any
injury or damage that would need to be considered under the proportionality
rule, that cyber operation still should not be conducted in a way that unnec-
essarily causes inconvenience to civilians or neutral persons.”137 It is impor-
136. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 131, at 1005 (Rule
16.5.2 states that, “A cyber operation that does not constitute an attack is not restricted by the
rules that apply to attacks. Factors that would suggest that a cyber operation is not an ‘attack’
include whether the operation causes only reversible effects or only temporary effects. Cyber
operations that generally would not constitute attacks include: defacing a government
webpage; a minor, brief disruption of internet services; briefly disrupting, disabling, or inter-
fering with communications; and disseminating propaganda. Since such operations generally
would not be considered attacks under the law of war, they generally would not need to be
directed at military objectives, and may be directed at civilians or civilian objects. Nonethe-
less, such operations must not be directed against enemy civilians or civilian objects unless the
operations are militarily necessary. Moreover, such operations should comport with the gen-
eral principles of the law of war. For example, even if a cyber operation is not an ‘attack’ or
does not cause any injury or damage that would need to be considered under the proportional-
ity rule, that cyber operation still should not be conducted in a way that unnecessarily causes
inconvenience to civilians or neutral persons.”).
137. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 131, at 1005 (Rule
16.5.2).
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tant to note that the Manual does not consider disruption, economic harms,
and inconvenience as part of the proportionality evaluation.138
In addition, the Manual offers somewhat of a hint towards a limited
protection against activities that are not attacks, yet seize or destroy enemy
property nonetheless, by providing that “[a] cyber operation that would not
constitute an attack, but would nonetheless seize or destroy enemy property,
would have to be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war.”139 That
could mean that disruptive cyber operations, which are allegedly not “at-
tacks” under the Law of War Manual approach, would still need to be justi-
fied under the military necessity rule, thus possibly limiting its effects on
civilians and civilian infrastructure. However, the Manual’s position on dis-
ruptive cyber operations is very limited, leaving much room for carrying out
these operations against civilians without an accountability regime.
2. Tallinn Manual
The Tallinn Manual defines “cyber attack” as a “cyber operation,
whether offensive or defensive, that is reasonable expected to cause injury or
death to persons or damage or destruction to objects.”140 The Manual also
reaffirms that to qualify as “attack” an action needs “violent effects” rather
than release of kinetic force.141 Although the Manual employs a physical-
effects approach to the concept of “attack,” it still provided that the IGE
were divided with regard to operations that interfere with functionality of
objects, with the majority holding the view that it would constitute an attack
if “replacement of physical components” is required.142 Within those experts,
there was no consensus on whether reinstalling the operating system could
suffice for the purposes of “attack,”143 however, a few of the experts be-
lieved that if such operation “necessitates data restoration,” it should be con-
sidered an attack.144
The Tallinn Manual adopts a pretty narrow, traditional perspective on
“attack”, but it is still submitted that majority of experts agreed that “there
might be logic” in characterizing largely disruptive cyber operations as “at-
138. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 131, at 1004 (Rule
16.5.1.1).
139. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, supra note 131, at 1004 (Rule
16.5.1).
140. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 106.
141. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 106-07 (Commentary 3 to
Rule 30).
142. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 108 (Commentary 10 to Rule
30).
143. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 108 (Commentary 10 to Rule
30).
144. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 109 (Commentary 11 to Rule
30).
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tacks.”145 However, these experts also claimed that IHL “does not presently
extend this far”, and a minority of these experts predicted that the interna-
tional community will most likely characterize such operations as “attacks,”
should they occur in the future.146 The Tallinn Manual, therefore, protects
civilians from direct attacks only if the cyber operation in question fits the
definition provided by the Manual, which focuses on physical
consequences.147
With regard to the applicability of the proportionality rule, the Tallinn
Manual provides that “cyber operations may cause inconvenience, irritation,
stress, or fear. Such consequences do not qualify as collateral damage . . .”148
The Manual does not define the scope of these terms, nor does he directly
deal with violent disruption effects as collateral damage.
3. GGE Report
Unlike the Law of War and Tallinn Manuals, the GGE Report has a
broader scope than simply analyzing IHL in relation to cyber operation. The
GGE Report generally focuses on threats to international peace and security
posed by the development of information and communication technologies
(“ICTs”).149 The GGE Report notes “the established international legal prin-
ciples, including, where applicable, the principles of humanity, necessity,
proportionality and distinction.”150 However, the GGE Report does not spe-
cifically analyze how these IHL principles apply to cyber operations, nor
does it deal with “attacks” or disruptive cyber operations in that context. The
main importance of the GGE Report is to incrementally come up with a set
of rules applicable to activities in cyberspace, and possible, address these
specific gaps and ambiguities in further detail in future reports.
V. CONCLUSION
Disruptive cyber operations during an armed conflict could become a
major threat to civilians, civilian property, and civilian wellbeing in the fu-
ture. The purpose of this paper is to introduce the notion of disruptive cyber
operations as “attacks” under IHL, thus limiting their use in accordance with
the principles of distinction, proportionality, and prohibition on indiscrimi-
nate attacks. Disruption itself, is a new form of violence, which ought to be
145. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 109 (Commentary 12 to Rule
30).
146. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 109 (Commentary 12 to Rule
30).
147. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 113 (Commentary 13 to Rule
32).
148. INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF EXPERTS, supra note 59, at 160 (Commentary 5 to Rule
51).
149. GGE Report, supra note 133, at 6, para. 1.
150. GGE Report, supra note 133, at 13, para. 28(d).
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incorporated in the ordinary meaning of “violence” in the context of “at-
tacks.” Violence is incrementally changing, and the effects that can be
brought about by cyber operations are increasing and posing a great chal-
lenge to contemporary legal frameworks, IHL being only one of them. These
arguments are certainly not prohibiting the use of cyber operations entirely,
whether destructive or disruptive, but limiting them using well-established
norms relating to the protection of civilians and civilian objects during an
armed conflict.
Current frameworks dealing with IHL and cyberspace are not addressing
disruption as a possible harm due to cyber operations, and more work is
required to mitigate future threats against civilians in that sense. Even the
most conservative readers of “attack” admit that state practice could develop
in a way that restricts the use of disruptive cyber operations in an armed
conflict, realizing how harmful these operations are when conducted against
civilians and civilian object.151
Disruptive cyber operations that reach the threshold of “attacks” by be-
ing violent have a practical and normative implication on current IHL. First,
is that disruptive cyber operations should be designed humanely, in accor-
dance with the duty to code humanely. Parties to a conflict are under obliga-
tion to ensure that these operations are capable of distinguishing between
civilians and military targets, and that they are directed against military
objectives alone. Secondly, to strengthen the standing of disruption as a le-
gitimate harm, the proportionality analysis should take into account possible
disruption harm to civilians as collateral damage. Similarly, the debate on
data as an “object” is based on obsolete distinction between tangible and
intangible, which are untenable in the digital age, where data is sometimes
more valuable than physical objects, with which traditional international law
is so inexplicably obsessed.
The common theme in this paper is the changing nature of conflict,
weapons, and targets. International law, remaining somewhat stagnant,
needs to catch up and adapt to this changing nature before it takes its toll.
However, realizing that international lawmaking has its own limitations, it is
unclear whether a treaty or custom will eventually address these emerging,
threatening, phenomena.
151. See Schmitt, supra note 61.
